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Abstract 
We document how demand shocks in export markets lead French multi-product exporters to re-allocate the 
mix of products sold in those destinations. In response to positive demand shocks, those French firms skew 
their export sales towards their best performing products; and also extend the range of products sold to that 
market. We develop a theoretical model of multi-product firms and derive the specific demand and cost 
conditions needed to generate these product-mix reallocations. Our theoretical model highlights how the 
increased competition from demand shocks in export markets .and the induced product mix reallocations - 
induce productivity changes within the firm. We then empirically test for this connection between the 
demand shocks and the productivity of multi-product firms exporting to those destinations. We find that 
the effect of those demand shocks on productivity are substantial .and explain an important share of 
aggregate productivity fluctuations for French manufacturing. 
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1 Introduction
Recent studies using detailed micro-level datasets on firms, plants, and the products they produce
have documented vast differences in all measurable performance metrics across those different units.
Those studies have also documented that these performance differences are systematically related to
participation in international markets (see, e.g., Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007, 2012)
for the U.S., and Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) for Europe): Exporting firms and plants are bigger,
more productive, more profitable, and less likely to exit than non-exporters. And better performing
firms and plants export a larger number of products to a larger number of destinations. Exporters
are larger in terms of employment, output, revenue and profit. Similar patterns also emerge across
the set of products sold by multi-product firms. There is a stable performance ranking for firms
based on the products’ performance in any given market, or in worldwide sales. Thus, better
performing products in one market are most likely to be the better performing products in any
other market (including the global export market). This also applies to the products’ selection into
a destination, so better performing products are also sold in a larger set of destinations.
Given this heterogeneity, trade shocks induce many different reallocations across firms and
products. Some of these reallocations are driven by ‘selection effects’ that determine which products
are sold where (across domestic and export markets), along with firm entry/exit decisions (into/out
of any given export market, or overall entry/exit of the firm). Other reallocations are driven by
‘skewness effects’ whereby – conditional on selection (a given set of products sold in a given market)
– trade affects the relative market shares of those products. Both types of reallocations generate
(endogenous) productivity changes that are independent of ‘technology’ (the production function
at the product-level). This creates an additional channel for the aggregate gains from trade.
Unfortunately, measuring the direct impact of trade on those reallocations across firms is a
very hard task. On one hand, shocks that affect trade are also likely to affect the distribution
of market shares across firms. On the other hand, changes in market shares across firms likely
reflect many technological factors (not related to reallocations). Looking at reallocations across
products within firms obviates many of these problems. Recent theoretical models of multi-product
firms highlight how trade induces a similar pattern of reallocations within firms as it does across
firms. And measuring reallocations within multi-product firms has several advantages: Trade
shocks that are exogenous to individual firms can be identified much more easily than at a higher
level of aggregation; Controls for any technology changes at the firm-level are also possible; and
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reallocations can be measured for the same set of narrowly defined products sold by the same
firm across destinations or over time. In addition, impediments to factor reallocations are likely
to be substantially higher across firms than across product lines within firms. Moreover, multi-
product firms dominate world production and trade flows. Hence, reallocations within multi-
product firms have the potential to generate large changes in aggregate productivity. Empirically,
we find very strong evidence for the effects of trade shocks on those reallocations, and ultimately
on the productivity of multi-product firms. The overall impact on aggregate French manufacturing
productivity is substantial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the recent empirical
literature on trade-induced reallocations. Section 3 introduces our dataset on French exporters
and provides novel evidence on such reallocations with a special emphasis on skewness effects. It
shows that positive demand shocks in any given destination market induce French exporters to
skew their product level export sales to that destination towards their best performing products.
These demand shocks also lead to strong positive responses in both the intensive and extensive
margins of export sales to that destination. Section 4 introduces a flexible theoretical framework
with multi-product firms to rationalize all this empirical evidence. Our framework highlights how
certain properties of demand – which relate to the curvature of the demand and marginal revenue
curves – are crucial in generating predictions for reallocations that are consistent with the data.
In particular, these empirically relevant properties rule out the case of constant elasticity demand.
They also imply that positive demand shocks engender increases in multi-product firm productivity
since those shocks induce firms to produce relatively more of their better performing products
(the skewness effect). Sections 5 and 6 take these predictions to the data and measure large
responses in multi-product firm productivity to demand shocks in export markets. We find that
these productivity responses explain an important share of aggregate productivity fluctuations for
French manufacturing.
2 Previous Evidence on Trade-Induced Reallocations
In a previous paper, Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014), we investigated, both theoretically and
empirically, the mechanics of product reallocations within multi-product firms across export desti-
nation markets. We used comprehensive firm-level data on annual shipments by all French exporters
to all countries in the world (not including the French domestic market) for a set of more than
10,000 goods. Firm-level exports are collected by French customs and include export sales for each
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8-digit (combined nomenclature or NC8) product by destination country. Our focus then was on
the cross-section of firm-product exports across destinations (for a single year, 2003). We presented
evidence that French multi-product firms indeed exhibit a stable ranking of products in terms of
their shares of export sales across export destinations with ‘core’ products being sold in a larger
number of destinations (and commanding larger market shares across destinations). We used the
term ‘skewness’ to refer to the concentration of these export market shares in any destination and
showed that this skewness consistently varied with destination characteristics such as GDP and
geography: French firms sold relatively more of their best performing products in bigger, more
centrally-located destinations (where competition from other exporters and domestic producers is
tougher).
Other research has also documented similar patterns of product reallocations (within multi-
product firms) over time following trade liberalization. For the case of CUSFTA/NAFTA, Baldwin
and Gu (2009), Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011), and Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) all report
that Canadian, U.S., and Mexican multi-product firms reduced the number of products they pro-
duce during these trade-liberalization episodes. Baldwin and Gu (2009) and Bernard, Redding and
Schott (2011) further report that CUSFTA induced a significant increase in the skewness of pro-
duction across products. Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) separately measure the skewness of Mexican
firms’ export sales to the US. They report an increase in this skewness following NAFTA: They
show that Mexican firms expanded their exports of their better performing products (higher mar-
ket shares) significantly more than those for their worse performing exported products during the
period of trade expansion from 1994− 2003.
As prices are rarely observed, there is little direct evidence on how markups, prices and costs
are related across products supplied with different productivity, and how they respond to trade
liberalization.1 A notable exception is the recent paper by De Loecker, Goldberg, Pavcnik and
Khandelwal (2016) who exploit unique information on the prices and quantities of Indian firms’
products over India’s trade liberalization period from 1989−2003. They also document that better
performing firms (higher sales and productivity) produce more products, before focusing on the
evidence for firm and product level markups. Across firms, they show that those better performing
firms also set higher markups. They also document a similar pattern across the products produced
by a given multi-product firm, which sets relatively higher markups on their better performing
1Prices are typically backed-out as unit values based on reported quantity information, which is extremely noisy.
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products (lower marginal cost and higher market shares).2 In addition, they show strong evidence
for endogenous markup adjustments via imperfect pass-through from products’ marginal costs to
their prices: Only a portion of marginal cost decreases are passed on to consumers in the form of
lower prices, while the remaining portion goes to higher markups. This is consistent with recent
firm-level evidence on exchange rate pass-through. Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) analyze the
heterogeneous reaction of French exporters to real exchange rate changes across destinations over
a decade (1995 − 2005). They find that on average firms react to depreciation by increasing their
markup. They also find that high-performance firms increases their markup significantly more –
implying that the pass-through rate is significantly lower for better performing firms.
Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) also find very strong evidence that this pass-through rate
(the elasticity of price with respect to the exchange rate) is heterogeneous across firms: it sharply
decreases with firm performance (better performing firms adjust their markups substantially more
than worse performing firms in response to the same exchange rate shock). Li, Ma and Xu (2015)
confirm this result of decreasing pass-through (with firm performance) for Chinese exporters. Amiti,
Itskoki, and Konings (2014) also find a very similar result for Belgian firms, whereby pass-through
is strongly decreasing with the Belgian firms’ export market share. Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro, and
Vichyanond (2013) also show this pattern for Brazilian exporters. In addition, they find that this
property of decreasing pass-through also holds within multi-product Brazilian firms across their set
of exported products. That is, they find substantially lower pass-through rates for a firm’s better
performing products (with relatively higher market shares).
This evidence on prices, markups, and pass-through is directly related to properties of demand
(such as its elasticity). We review those connections when we introduce our theoretical model and
its demand properties. We will then show that the same demand properties are required to generate
the product reallocations that we document in the following section. This provides an independent
source of confirmation for the evidence based on product-level prices.
3 Reallocations Over Time
We now document how changes within a destination market over time induce a similar pattern of
reallocations as the ones we previously described (holding across destinations). More specifically,
we show that demand shocks in any given destination market induce firms to skew their product
2Using product-level prices for multi-product firms, Dhyne et al (2016) also document a strong correlation between
a product’s sales rank and its productivity.
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level export sales to that destination towards their best performing products. In terms of first
moments, we show that these demand shocks also lead to strong positive responses in both the
intensive and extensive margins of export sales to that destination.
3.1 Data
We use the same data source for firm exports (described in Section 2) as Mayer, Melitz and
Ottaviano (2014), extended to cover multiple years from 1995-2005. All firms operating in the
French metropolitan territory must report their export sales according to the following criteria:
Exports to each EU destination whenever within-EU exports exceeds 100,000 Euros;3 and exports
to non-EU country whenever exports to that destination exceeds 1,000 Euros or a ton. Despite
these limitations, the database is nearly comprehensive. For instance, in 2005, 103,220 firms report
exports across 234 destination countries (or territories) for 9873 products. This represents data on
over 2.2 million shipments.
We restrict our analysis to firms whose main activity is classified as manufacturing to ensure
that firms take part in the production of the goods they export.4 This leaves us with data covering
more than a million shipments by firms across all manufacturing sectors.5
Matched balance-sheet data provide us with information on variables that are needed to assess
firm productivity such as turnover, value added, employment, investment, raw material use and
capital. However, we can only measure product reallocations in terms of sales in export markets
as the breakdown of sales across products for the domestic market is not available to us. We
will have to take this into account in designing our estimation strategy. The balance-sheet data
we have access to comes in two sources where the official identification number of the firm can
be matched with customs information. The first source is the EAE, produced by the national
statistical institute, and exhaustive for manufacturing firms with size exceeding 20 employees. The
second is BRN, which comes from tax authorities, and includes a broader coverage of firms, since it
is based on the firm’s legal tax regime and a relatively low sales threshold. Whenever firm data is
3If this threshold is not met, firms can choose to report under a simplified scheme without supplying separate
EU export destinations. However, in practice, many firms under the threshold report their exports by destination.
During our sample period, the threshold increased from 38,050 Euros (250,000 French Francs) to 100,000 Euros in
2001. We have checked that all our results are robust to using only the 1996-2001 subsample (a sample period that
also features a more stable product classification schedule; See Pierce and Schott, 2012).
4Some large distributors such as Carrefour account for a disproportionate number of annual export shipments.
5In a robustness check, we also drop observations for firms that report an affiliate abroad. This avoids the issue
that multinational firms may substitute exports of some of their best performing products with affiliate production in
the destination country (affecting our measurement of product reallocations). Results are quantitatively very similar
in all regressions.
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available from both sources, we give precedence to the EAE data (which is more closely monitored
by the statistical authorities).6 Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics relevant to the match
between customs and balance sheet data. The overall match is not perfect but covers between 88
and 95 percent of the total value of French exports. The match with firms declaring manufacturing
as their main activity is still very good although there is a clear trend of declining quality of match,
particularly after 2000. This is also visible in the aggregate growth rate of exports in our sample
(column 5) that overall provide a quite good match of the overall exports growth rate in column
(4), but deteriorating over time. Our investigations suggest that the increasing propensity of large
French manufacturers to declare their main activity as retail or some other service activity might
provide part of that explanation.7 Overall our matched dataset is very comparable to recent papers
using the same primary sources as in by Eaton et al. (2011), Berman et al. (2012) or di Giovanni
et al. (2014) for instance.
Table 1: Aggregate Exports, Production, Employment, and Productivity
Exports
Value Share Growth Rate VA Emp. VA/Emp.
Year B Eur Match Mfg Full Mfg B Eur M work. K Eur Growth
1995 211.3 94.9 74.0 177.1 2.903 61.0
1996 219.6 93.5 73.2 3.9 2.8 178.6 2.918 61.2 0.3
1997 252.7 92.8 72.6 15.1 14.2 188.0 2.899 64.8 6.0
1998 267.1 92.0 72.1 5.7 4.9 193.3 2.914 66.3 2.3
1999 277.5 91.1 71.7 3.9 3.3 198.9 2.870 69.3 4.5
2000 319.4 90.8 71.9 15.1 15.4 209.5 2.924 71.6 3.4
2001 324.6 89.9 69.0 1.6 -2.3 199.4 2.932 68.0 -5.1
2002 321.7 90.4 68.4 -0.9 -1.8 198.0 2.865 69.1 1.7
2003 314.3 90.4 65.3 -2.3 -6.7 187.3 2.633 71.1 2.9
2004 335.0 88.4 64.6 6.6 5.4 193.2 2.577 75.0 5.4
2005 350.8 88.0 62.9 4.7 1.9 194.9 2.505 77.8 3.8
Column (1): Total value of exports from customs data. Column (2): Export share of firms matched with
balance-sheet data from BRN/EAE. Column (3): Export share of matched firms with main activity
classified as manufacturing. Columns (4) and (5): Export growth rates for customs data and subset of
manufacturing firms. Columns (6) to (8): Aggregate value added, employment, and their ratio for the
subset of manufacturing firms. Column (9): Growth rate of labor productivity from previous column.
6The correlations between variables reported both in EAE and BRN (value added, employment, exports, capital
stock) are very high: between .91 and .99 in all cases.
7This is another reason why we check all our results against the early 1996-2001 sub-sample.
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3.2 Measuring Export Demand Shocks
Consider a firm i exporting a number of products s in industry I to destination d in year t. We
measure industries (I) at the 3-digit ISIC level (35 different classifications across French manu-
facturing). We consider several measures of demand shocks that affect this export flow. At the
most aggregate level we use the variation in GDP in d, log GDPd,t. At the industry level I, we use
total imports into d excluding French exports, logM Id,t. We can also use our detailed product-level
shipment data to construct a firm i-specific demand shock:
trade shockIi,d,t ≡ logM sd,t for all products s ∈ I exported by firm i to d in year t0, (1)
where M sd,t represents total imports into d (again, excluding French exports) for product s and
the overline represents the (unweighted) mean. For world trade, the finest level of product level of
aggregation is the HS-6 level (from UN-COMTRADE and CEPII-BACI)8, which is more aggregated
than our NC8 classification for French exports (roughly 5,300 HS products per year versus 10,000
NC8 products per year). The construction of the last trade shock is very similar to the one for
the industry level imports logM Id,t, except that we only use imports into d for the precise product
categories that firm i exports to d.9 In order to ensure that this demand shock is exogenous to the
firm, we use the set of products exported by the firm in its first export year in our sample (1995,
or later if the firm starts exporting later on in our sample), and then exclude this year from our
subsequent analysis. Note that we use an un-weighted average so that the shocks for all exported
products s (within an industry I) are represented proportionately.10
For all of these demand shocks Xt = GDPd,t,M
I
d,t, M
s
d,t, we compute the first difference as the
Davis-Haltiwanger growth rate: ∆˜Xt ≡ (Xt −Xt−1) / (.5Xt + .5Xt−1). This measure of the first
difference preserves observations when the shock switches from 0 to a positive number, and has a
maximum growth rate of −2 or 2. This is mostly relevant for our measure of the firm-specific trade
shock, where the product-level imports into d, M sd,t can often switch between 0 and positive values.
Whenever Xt−1, Xt > 0, ∆˜Xt is monotonic in ∆ logXt and approximately linear for typical growth
8See Gaulier and Zignago (2010).
9There is a one-to-many matching between the NC8 and HS6 product classifications, so every NC8 product is
assigned a unique HS6 classification. We use the same Msd,t data for any NC8 product s within the same HS6
classification.
10Thus, positive idiosyncratic demand shocks to high market-share products (which mechanically contribute to
increase the skewness of product sales) are given the same weight as positive idiosyncratic shocks to low market-
share products (which mechanically contribute to decrease the skewness of product sales); and vice-versa for negative
shocks.
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rates (|∆ logXt| < 2).11 We thus obtain our three measures of demand shocks in first differences:
∆˜GDPd,t, ∆˜M
I
d,t, ∆˜M
s
d,t. From here on out, we refer to these three shocks, respectively, as GDP
shock, trade shock – ISIC, and trade shock. Note that this last firm-level shock, ∆˜M sd,t, represents
the un-weighted average of the growth rates for all products exported by the firm in t− 1.
3.3 The Impact of Demand Shocks on Trade Margins and Skewness
Before focusing on the effects of the demand shocks on the skewness of export sales, we first show
how the demand shocks affect firm export sales at the intensive and extensive margins (the first
moments of the distribution of product export sales). Table 2 reports how our three demand shocks
(in first differences) affect changes in firm exports to destination d in ISIC I (so each observation
represents a firm-destination-ISIC combination). We decompose the firm’s export response to each
shock into an intensive margin (average exports per product) and an extensive margin (number of
exported products). We clearly see how all three demand shocks induce very strong (and highly
significant) positive responses for both margins. This confirms that our demand shocks capture
important changes in the local demand faced by French exporters.12
Table 2: Demand Shocks and Local Exports
Dependent Variable ∆ log Exports per Product ∆ log # Products Exported
∆˜ GDP Shock 0.493a 0.149a
(0.048) (0.016)
∆˜ trade shock 0.277a 0.076a
(0.009) (0.004)
∆˜ trade shock - ISIC 0.039a 0.014a
(0.005) (0.002)
Observations 401575 407520 407520 401575 407520 407520
Standard errors in parentheses: c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a < 0.01. All regressions include year dummies,
and standard errors clustered at the level relevant for the variable of interest: destination country
for columns (1) and (4), firm-destination for columns (2) and (5) and ISIC-destination for columns
(3) and (6).
11Switching to first difference growth rates measured as ∆ logXt (and dropping products with zero trade in the
trade shock average) does not materially affect any of our results.
12Specifications using the log levels of the shocks and firm-destination-ISIC fixed-effects yield similar results. Other
specifications including the three covariates show that those demand shocks are different enough to be estimated
jointly while each keeping its positive sign and statistical significance. We also have experimented with the addition
of a control for a worldwide shock (aggregated from the destination-specific shocks using the firm’s prior year export
shares). The effect of this additional control on the destination-specific coefficient is negligible, thus confirming that
worldwide shocks do not influence the coefficients presented in Table 2.
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We now investigate the consequences of those demand shocks for the skewness of export sales
(independent of the level of product sales). In Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014), we focused on
those effects in the cross-section across destinations. Here, we examine the response of skewness
within a destination over time using our new demand shocks. We rely on the Theil index as our
measure of skewness due to its aggregation properties: We will later aggregate the export responses
at the destination-ISIC level up to the firm-level – in order to generate predictions for firm-level
productivity. Thus, our measure of skewness for the distribution of firm i’s exports to destination
d in industry I, xsi,d,t, is the Theil index (computed over all N
I
idt products s that firm i exports to
d in year t):
T Ii,d,t ≡
1
N Iidt
∑
s∈I
xsi,d,t
x¯Iidt
log
(
xsi,d,t
x¯Iidt
)
, x¯Iidt ≡
∑
s∈I x
s
idt
N Iidt
. (2)
Table 3 reports regressions of this skewness measure on all three demand shocks (jointly) – at
the firm-destination-ISIC level. In the first column, we use a specification in (log) levels (FE), and
use firm-destination-ISIC fixed effects to isolate the variation over time. In the second column, we
return to our specification in first differences (FD). In the third column we add the firm-destination-
ISIC fixed effects to this specification in first differences (FD-FE). This controls for any trend growth
rate in our demand shocks over time. Across all three specifications, we see that positive demand
shocks induce a highly significant increase in the skewness of firm export sales to a destination.
The effect of all three shocks are weakened a little bit due to some collinearity, in particular in the
most-demanding FD-FE specification. To highlight this effect, we re-run our FD-FE specification
with each shock entered independently. Those results are reported in the first column of Table
4. Each row is the result of that independent regression with each shock. In this case, even the
weakest ISIC-level shock remains significant at the 1% level.13
The three remaining columns of Table 4 show additional robustness specifications with an
alternative measure of skewness–the Atkinson index. This index was developed to allow for greater
flexibility in quantifying the contribution of different parts of the distribution to overall inequality.
It is defined as:
AI,ηi,d,t ≡

1− 1
x¯Iidt
[
1
NIidt
∑
s∈I(x
s
idt)
1−η
] 1
1−η
, x¯Iidt ≡
∑
s∈I x
s
idt
NIidt
, for 0 ≤ η 6= 1
1− 1
x¯Iidt
[∏
s∈I x
s
idt
] 1
NI
idt , for η = 1
(3)
13Just as we did for the impact of the destination-specific trade shocks on the first moment of exports (extensive
and intensive margins), we experimented with the addition of a control for the firm’s worldwide shock. Once again,
the effect of this additional control on the destination-specific coefficient is negligible, thus confirming that worldwide
shocks do not influence the coefficients presented in Table 4.
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Table 3: Demand shocks and local skewness
Dependent Variable T Ii,d,t ∆T
I
i,d,t
Specification FE FD FD-FE
log GDP shock 0.075a
(0.016)
log trade shock 0.048a
(0.005)
log trade shock - ISIC 0.002a
(0.000)
∆˜ GDP Shock 0.066a 0.066a
(0.012) (0.015)
∆˜ trade shock 0.037a 0.033a
(0.005) (0.006)
∆˜ trade shock - ISIC 0.006a 0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Observations 479387 401575 401575
Standard errors in parentheses: c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a < 0.01.
FE refers to firm-destination-ISIC fixed effects. All regressions
include year dummies, and standard errors clustered at the level
of the destination country.
The parameter η is often called the inequality aversion parameter as higher values put more weight
on the low end of the distribution. When η gets close to 0, more weight is given to high values, in our
case to the firm’s best performing products. As η increases, more weight is given to the distribution
of the firm’s worse performing products relative to the best performing ones. This Atkinson index is
also equal to one minus the ratio of the generalized (CES) mean over the arithmetic mean. Different
values of η provide different special cases of the generalized mean: with η = 2, it is the harmonic
mean, whereas with η = 1 it is the geometric mean. In the limit, when η = 0, it is the arithmetic
mean, in which case there can never be any inequality (AI,ηi,d,t ≡ 0 for any distribution of product
sales xsidt). Table 4 reproduces our skewness results for a wide range of inequality parameters η,
starting with a low value of η = .5 along with the special cases of η = 1 and η = 2.14 Those results,
reported in columns (2-4), clearly show that the effect of the demand shocks on skewness do not
rely on the Theil functional form nor on a specific weighing scheme for the Atkinson index.
The skewness measures in Table 4 combine changes to both the intensive product mix margin
(the relative sales of different products exported in both t − 1 and t), and the extensive margin
14This range of parameters is also consistent with that advocated by Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) for the
evaluation of income inequality.
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Table 4: Skewness and Shocks: Robustness - Skewness Measure
RHS ∆T Ii,d,t ∆A
I,.5
i,d,t ∆A
I,1
i,d,t ∆A
I,2
i,d,t
∆˜ GDP Shock 0.090a 0.039a 0.058a 0.058a
(0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
∆˜ Trade Shock 0.042a 0.018a 0.024a 0.023a
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
∆˜ Trade Shock - ISIC 0.008a 0.004a 0.006a 0.005a
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: This table presents the results of individual FD-FE regressions
where the columns give the LHS and the rows give the RHS variables.
All regressions include year and firm-destination-ISIC fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the destination
country.
Table 5: Skewness and Shocks: Robustness - Intensive Margin
RHS ∆T I,consti,d,t ∆A
I,.5,const
i,d,t ∆A
I,1,const
i,d,t ∆A
I,2,const
i,d,t ∆ log R
I
i,d,t
∆˜ GDP Shock 0.006 0.005 0.012b 0.014b 0.157a
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.067)
∆˜ Trade Shock 0.012a 0.007a 0.011a 0.010a 0.059b
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.027)
∆˜ Trade Shock - ISIC 0.005a 0.002a 0.004a 0.004a 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
Notes: This table presents the results of individual FD-FE regressions where the columns give the
LHS and the rows give the RHS variables. All regressions include year and firm-destination-ISIC
fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the destination country.
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(products sold in one period but not the other). We now isolate the skewness response that is
driven only by the intensive product mix margin. To do this, we recompute the skewness measures
from Table 4 on the restricted subset of products that are exported in both t − 1 and t (denoted
with a “const” superscript). Results using these intensive margin skewness measures are reported
in the first 4 columns of Table 5. In column 5, we introduce one last skewness measure for the
intensive margin: the sales ratio (in logs) of the firm’s best to second best performing product
(in terms of global export sales). The effect of our firm-level trade shock is significant across all
these specifications (and significant well beyond the 1% level for all the distribution wide skewness
measures). The intensive margin skewness results for the ISIC-level trade shock and the GDP shock
are always positive and significant in most (but not all) of those specifications.
4 Theoretical Framework
In the previous section we documented the pattern of product reallocations in response to demand
shocks in export markets. We now develop a theoretical model of multi-product firms that highlights
the specific demand conditions needed to generate this pattern. We show that these demand
conditions are consistent with all of the micro-level evidence on firm/product selections, prices,
and markups presented in section 2. In particular, those demand conditions highlight how demand
shocks lead to changes in competition for exporters in those markets (which lead to the observed
reallocations). Those reallocations, in turn, generate changes in firm productivity. We directly
investigate the empirical connection between demand shocks and productivity in the following
sections.
Our theoretical model contributes to the growing literature emphasizing demand systems with
variable price elasticities for models of trade.15 Our main point of departure relative to those papers
is that we seek to connect the demand conditions on variable elasticities (and further properties
of demand) directly to the evidence on the product reallocations that we document; and our
additional goal of empirically connecting those to firm-level productivity. In this spirit, our paper
is most closely related to Arkolakis et al (2015) and Asplund and Nocke (2006), who also directly
connect their theoretical modeling of endogenous markups with empirical moments: Arkolakis et
al (2015) focus on the implications for the welfare gains from trade; and Asplund and Nocke (2006)
focus on the implications for firm turnover in a dynamic setting.
15See, for example, Bertoletti and Epifani (2014), Dhingra and Morrow (2014), Fabinger and Weyl (2014), Mrazova
and Neary (2014), and Zhelebodko et al (2012).
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4.1 Closed Economy
To better highlight the role played by the properties of the demand system, we initially start with
a closed economy and analyze the impact of demand shocks on product reallocations. We then
develop an open economy version of our model that meshes more closely with our empirical setup.
We show how demand shocks in an export market induce very similar product reallocations as in
the closed economy (but for exporters to that market). We develop both a general equilibrium
(with a single differentiated good sector for the whole economy) and a partial equilibrium version
focusing on a single sector among many in the economy. In the latter, we also introduce a short-run
version where entry is restricted general equilibrium is inherently a long-run scenario). We show
how demand shocks induce the same skewness pattern in all of these modeling alternatives. This
highlights the critical role of the demand system in shaping the pattern of reallocations.
Multi-Product Production with Additive Separable Utility
We consider a sector with a single productive factor, labor. We will distinguish between two
scenarios. The first is the standard general equilibrium (GE) setup with a single sector. The
exogenous labor endowment L indexes both the number of workers Lw (with inelastic supply) and
consumers Lc. We choose the endogenous wage as the numeraire. Aggregate expenditures are
then given by the exogenous labor endowment. In our partial equilibrium (PE) scenario, we focus
on the sector as a small part of the economy. We take the number of consumers Lc as well as
their individual expenditures on the sector’s output as exogenously given. The supply of labor
Lw to the sector is perfectly elastic at an exogenous economy-wide wage. We choose units so
that both this wage and the exogenous expenditure per-consumer is equal to 1. This involves a
normalization for the measure of consumers Lc and the choice of labor as numeraire: Aggregate
accounting then implies that this normalized number of consumers Lc represents a fraction of the
labor endowment L.16 In both scenarios, we model a demand shock as an increase in the number of
consumers Lc. This increases aggregate expenditures one-for-one, given our assumptions of unitary
consumer income. In our GE scenario, this increase is associated with a proportional increase in
16As we will restrict our analysis to additively separable preferences – which are non-homothetic – changes in
consumer income will have different effects than changes in the number of consumers Lc. We focus on this functional
form for tractability and do not wish to emphasize its properties for income elasticities. As first highlighted by
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), additively separable preference imply a specific relationship between price and income
elasticities. We emphasize the properties of demand for those price elasticities. Thus, we analyze changes in the
number of consumers Lc holding their income fixed. This is akin to indexing the preferences to a given reference
income level.
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labor supplied Lw. In our PE scenario, the labor supply response is left unrestricted, isolating the
demand-side effects.
In both scenarios each consumer’s utility is assumed to be additively separable over a continuum
of imperfectly substitutable products indexed by i ∈ [0,M ] where M is the measure of products
available. The representative consumer then solves the following utility maximization problem:
max
qi≥0
∫ M
0
u(qi)di s.t.
∫ M
0
piqidi = 1,
where u(qi) is the sub-utility associated with the consumption of qi units of product i. We assume
that this sub-utility exhibits the following properties:
(A1) u(qi) ≥ 0 with equality for qi = 0; u′(qi) > 0 and u′′(qi) < 0 for qi ≥ 0.
The first order condition for the consumer’s problem determines the inverse residual demand func-
tion (per consumer):
p(qi) =
u′(qi)
λ
, (4)
where λ =
∫M
0 u
′(qi)qidi > 0 is the marginal utility of income. Given our assumption of separable
preferences, this marginal utility of income λ is the unique endogenous aggregate demand shifter:
Higher λ shifts all residual demand curves inward ; we refer to this as an increase in competition
for a given level of market demand Lc. Concavity of u(qi) ensures that the chosen consumption
level from (4) also satisfies the second order condition for the consumer’s problem. This residual
demand curve (4) is associated with a marginal revenue curve
φ(qi) =
u′(qi) + u′′(qi)qi
λ
. (5)
Let εp(qi) ≡ −p′(qi)qi/p(qi) and εφ(qi) ≡ −φ′(qi)qi/φ(qi) denote the elasticities of inverse demand
and marginal revenue (expressed in absolute values). Thus εp(qi) ≥ 0 is the inverse price elasticity
of demand (less than 1 for elastic demand). Although the demand and marginal revenue curves are
residual (they depend on λ), their elasticities are nonetheless independent of λ. These preferences
nest the C.E.S. case where the elasticities εp(qi) and εφ(qi) are constant; using the additively
separable functional form for C.E.S., the marginal utility of income λ is then an inverse monotone
function of the C.E.S. price index.
Products are supplied by firms that may be single- or multi-product. Market structure is
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monopolistically competitive as in Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014): each product is supplied
by a single firm and each firm supplies a countable number of products (among the continuum
of consumed products). Technology exhibits increasing returns to scale associated with a fixed
overhead cost, along with a constant marginal cost of production. We assume that the fixed cost
f is common for all products while the marginal cost v (variety level cost) is heterogeneous. For
a given firm, products are indexed in increasing order m of marginal cost from a ‘core product’
indexed by m = 0. Firm entry incurs a sunk cost fe. After this cost is incurred, entrants randomly
draw the marginal cost for their core product from a common continuous differentiable distribution
Γ(c) with support over [0,∞); we refer to this cost draw as the firm’s core competency.17 This
gives an entrant the exclusive blueprint used to produce a countable range of additional products
indexed by the integer m (potentially zero) at marginal cost v(m, c) ≡ cz(m) with z(0) = 1 and
z′(m) > 0.18
Product-Level Performance and Selection
A firm owning the blueprint for product i with marginal cost v and facing demand conditions λ
chooses the optimal output per consumer q(v, λ) to maximize total product-level profits Lc [p(qi)qi − vqi]−
f , so long as those profits are non-negative; or does not produce product i otherwise.19 The first
order condition whenever production occurs equalizes marginal revenue with marginal cost:
φ(q(v, λ)) = v. (6)
In order to ensure that the solution to this maximization problem exists (for at least some v > 0)
and is unique, we further restrict our choice of preferences to satisfy:
(A2) εp(0) < 1 and (A3) εφ(qi) > 0 for qi ≥ 0.
These assumptions ensure that marginal revenue is decreasing for all output levels (A3) and positive
(elastic demand) for at least some output levels (A2).
17This assumption of infinite support is made for simplicity in order to rule out the possibility of an equilibrium
without any firm selection. We could also introduce an upper-bound cost draw so long as this upper-bound is high
enough that the equilibrium features selection (some firms do not produce).
18The assumption z′(m) > 0 will generate the within-firm ranking of products discussed in Section 2. In the limit
case when z′(m) is infinite, all firms only produce a single product.
19As we have assumed that any firm’s set of product is of measure zero relative to the set of available products M ,
there is no product inter-dependence in the firm’s pricing/output decision (no cannibalization).
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The profit maximizing price associated with the output choice (6) can be written in terms of
the chosen markup µ(qi) ≡ 1/ (1− εp(qi)):
p(q(v, λ)) = µ(q(v, λ))v. (7)
Those output and price choices are associated with the following product-level revenues and oper-
ating profits per-consumer :
r(v, λ) = p(q(v, λ))q(v, λ) and pi(v, λ) = [p(q(v, λ))− v] q(v, λ).
Total product-level sales are then given by Lcr(v, λ) while total product net profits are Lcpi(v, λ)−f .
Using the first order condition for profit maximization (6) and our derivations for marginal revenue
(5) and markup (7), the elasticities for all these product-level performance measures can be written
in term of the elasticities of demand and marginal revenue:
εq,v = − 1
εφ
, εq,λ = − 1
εφ
(8)
εr,v = −1− εp
εφ
, εr,λ = −1− εp
εφ
− 1, (9)
εpi,v = −1− εp
εp
, εpi,λ = − 1
εp
, (10)
where we use the elasticity notation εg,x to denote the elasticity of the function g with respect to
x. All of the elasticities with respect to the product marginal cost v are negative, indicating that
lower marginal cost is associated with higher output, sales, and profit (both operating and net).
As expected, an increase in competition λ (for any given level of market demand Lc) will result in
lower output, sales, and profit for all products.
Since operating profit is monotonic in a product’s marginal cost v, the production decision
associated with non-negative net profit will lead to a unique cutoff cost level vˆ satisfying
pi(vˆ, λ)Lc = f. (11)
All products with cost v ≤ vˆ will be produced. Since v(0, c) = c (recall that v(m, c) = cz(m); z(0) =
1) any firm with core competency c ≤ vˆ will produce at least its core (m = 0) product. Thus,
cˆ = vˆ will be the firm-level survival cutoff. Those surviving firms (with c ≤ cˆ) will produce
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M(c) = max {m | cz(m) ≤ vˆ} additional products (potentially none, and then M(c) = 0) and earn
firm-level net profits:
Π(c, λ) =
M(c)∑
m=0
[pi (cz(m), λ)Lc − f ] .
Since εpi,v and εpi,λ are both negative, increases in competition λ – holding market demand L
c
constant – will be associated with lower cutoffs vˆ = cˆ. Tougher competition thus leads to tougher
selection: the least productive firms exit and all surviving firms shed (weakly) their worst performing
products.
Free Entry in the Long-Run
In the long-run when entry is unrestricted, the expected profit of the prospective entrants adjusts
to match the sunk cost:
∫ ĉ
0
Π(c, λ)dΓ(c) =
∞∑
m=0
{∫ ĉ/z(m)
0
[pi (cz(m), λ)Lc − f ] dΓ(c)
}
= fe. (12)
This free entry condition, along with the zero cutoff profit condition (11) jointly determine the
equilibrium cutoffs vˆ = cˆ along with the competition level λ. The number of entrants N e is then
determined by the consumer’s budget constraint:
N e
{ ∞∑
m=0
[∫ ĉ/z(m)
0
r(cz(m), λ)dΓ(c)
]}
= 1. (13)
These conditions hold in both our GE and PE scenarios.
Since labor is the unique factor and numeraire, we can convert the firms’ costs (both per-
unit production costs and the fixed costs) into employment. Aggregating over all firms yields the
aggregate labor demanded:
Lw = N e
(
fe +
∞∑
m=0
{∫ ĉ/z(m)
0
[cz(m)q (cz(m), λ)Lc + f ] dΓ(c)
})
As the free entry condition (12) entails no ex-ante aggregate profits (aggregate revenue is equal
to the payments to all workers, including those employed to cover the entry costs), this aggregate
labor demand Lw will be equal to the number of consumers Lc. This ensures labor market clearing
in our GE scenario. In our PE scenario, this implies that the endogenous labor supply adjusts so
that it equalizes the normalized number of consumers (recall that this is an exogenous fraction of
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the economy-wide labor endowment).20
In these long-run scenarios, the impact of an increase in demand Lc on the cutoffs will depend on
some further assumptions on demand, which we discuss in detail following the introduction of our
short-run scenario. However, we note that the impact for the level of competition λ is unambiguous:
higher demand leads to increases in competition λ.21
Short-Run Scenario
We now consider an alternative short-run situation in which the number of incumbents is fixed at
N¯ in the PE scenario (with the same exogenous distribution of core competencies Γ(c)). In this
case, free entry (12) no longer holds: firms with core competencies below the profit cutoff in (11)
produce while the remaining firms shut-down. However, the budget constraint (13) still holds with
the exogenous number of incumbents N¯ now replacing the endogenous number of entrants N e.
Together with the zero cutoff profit (11), those two conditions jointly determine the endogenous
cutoffs vˆ = cˆ and competition level λ.
As was the case in the long-run scenarios with free-entry, an increase in demand Lc must lead
to an increase in competition λ.22 However, the response of the cutoffs is now unambiguous:
the increase in demand must raise profits for all products (given their cost v) since there is no
induced response in entry; leading to an increase in the cutoffs vˆ = cˆ.23 In this short-run scenario,
it is the production of these new varieties (previously unprofitable) that generates the increased
competition. In the long run, the increased competition is driven by the entry of new firms (and
the varieties they produce).
20This sector-level adjustment for labor supply is very similar to the case of C.E.S. product differentiation within
sectors and Cobb-Douglas preferences across sectors. In the latter case, the sector’s labor supply adjusts so that it
is equal (as a fraction of the aggregate labor endowment) to the exogenous Cobb-Douglas expenditure share for the
sector. See Melitz & Redding (2014) for an example of those preferences with firm heterogeneity.
21Competition λ must strictly increase for the free entry condition to hold. If λ decreased (even weakly), then net
profit for a given variety pi(v, λ)Lc − f should strictly increase (given dLc > 0 and εpi,λ < 0). The cutoffs vˆ = cˆ must
then strictly increase (given 11); along with the average firm profit (the left-hand-side) in the free-entry condition
(12). Thus, this condition could not hold if λ weakly decreased.
22Competition λ must strictly increase in order to satisfy the budget constraint (13) with a fixed number of
incumbents. As we argued in a previous footnote (21), λ weakly decreasing would imply a strict increase in the
cutoffs vˆ = cˆ. This would entail both a strict increase in the number of products consumed as well as a weak increase
in expenditures per-product r(v, λ) for each consumer (recall that εr,λ < 0). This would necessarily violate the
consumer’s budget constraint.
23Note that with a fixed number of incumbents, the budget constraint (13) implies an increasing relationship
between the cutoff cˆ and the level of competition λ (which reduces product-level revenues r(v, λ) for all products).
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Curvature of Demand
Up to now, we have placed very few restrictions on the shape of the residual demand curves that the
firms face, other than the conditions (A1)-(A3) needed to ensure a unique monopolistic competition
equilibrium. In particular, the rates of change of the elasticities of residual demand and marginal
revenue (the signs of ε′p(qi) and ε′φ(qi)) were left unrestricted. We now show how further restrictions
on those rates of change (or alternatively the curvature of demand and marginal revenue) are
intrinsically tied to product-level reallocations – in addition to their better known consequences
for prices, markups and pass-through. After we develop the open economy version of our model in
the next section, we highlight the reverse connection from the pattern of product reallocations we
documented in Section 3 back to their necessary conditions for demand. Throughout, we assume
that conditions (A1)-(A3) hold in our monopolistic competition equilibrium. Thus, a necessary
condition for an empirical pattern is an additional condition that must hold (to generate that
empirical prediction) conditional on those initial assumptions.
The further restrictions on the shapes of demand and marginal revenue are:
(B1) ε′p(qi) > 0 for qi ≥ 0,
and
(B1’) ε′φ(qi) > 0 for qi ≥ 0.
Figure 1 depicts a log-log graph of the inverse demand and marginal revenue curves satisfying
those restrictions. Under (B1) demand becomes more inelastic with consumption. This is also
known as Marshall’s Second Law of Demand.24 It is a necessary and sufficient condition for better
performing products (lower v) to have higher markups and for tougher competition (higher λ) to
lower markups for any given product (given a cost v).25 Thus, the evidence discussed in Section
24We thank Peter Neary for bringing this reference to our attention. (B1) is equivalent to the assumption by
Arkolakis et al (2015) that the demand function of any product is log-concave in log-prices. In the terminology of
Neary and Mrazova (2014) it defines the “sub-convex” case, with “sub-convexity” of an inverse demand function at
an arbitrary point being equivalent to the function being less convex at that point than a CES demand function
with the same elasticity. In the terminology of Zhelobodko et al (2012), this class of preferences exhibits increasing
“relative love of variety” (RLV) as consumers care more about variety when their consumption level is higher. In the
terminology of Kimball (1995), this class of preferences exhibits a positive superelasticity of demand. Bertoletti and
Epifani (2014) refer to this case as “decreasing elasticity of substitution”. The “Adjustable pass-through” (APT) class
of demand functions proposed by Fabinger and Weyl (2012) also satisfies (B1). Lastly, condition (B1) is sufficient
for the induced maximized profit function to exhibit all the properties postulated by Asplund and Nocke (2006) in
order to explain the empirical relationship between market size and firm turnover that they document (in a dynamic
setting).
25Since both higher cost v and higher λ is associated with lower output q(v, λ); See (8).
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2, linking better product and firm performance to higher markups implies that (B1) must hold. It
is also consistent with the estimates of Arkolakis et al (2015) for bilateral trade demand. In our
model with monopolistic competition, (B1) is also equivalent to an alternate condition that the pass-
through elasticity from marginal cost to price θ ≡ ∂ ln p(q(v, λ))/∂ ln v = εp/εφ is less than 1 (see
appendix for proof). Thus, the vast empirical evidence on incomplete pass-through (see the survey
by Burstein and Gopinath, 2014) also requires demand condition (B1). Most importantly, we will
show that (B1) is a necessary condition for the evidence we documented on product reallocations
for French exporters. This provides an independent confirmation for this demand condition that
does not rely on the (very noisy) measurement of product prices and the estimation of markups
(or alternatively marginal costs).
log p, log mr
log qi
DMR
Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Demand Assumptions
Assumption (B1’) is more restrictive than (B1): in the appendix, we show how (B1’) implies
(B1). If only (B1) holds, then the log demand curve would have the shape shown in Figure 1,
but the log marginal revenue curve would need not be globally concave. However, it would still
have to be everywhere steeper than log demand: εφ(qi) > εp(qi) for all qi ≥ 0 (see appendix).
Whereas (B1) entails an increasing relationship between output and markup (and hence the level
of pass-through), (B1’) adds a connection between changes in output and changes in markups
(and hence differences in pass-through). More specifically, (B1’) holds if and only if the pass-
through rate θ is increasing with marginal cost v: better performing products (lower v) have lower
(more incomplete) pass-through: their markups adjust by more (in response to a given percentage
shock to marginal cost) than worse performing products. Thus, (B1’) is a necessary condition for
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the evidence on such pass-through differences that we previously discussed (for French, Belgian,
Brazilian, and Chinese firms/products). In the following section, we show that (B1’) is a sufficient
condition for the product reallocations we previously described for French exporters, in addition to
all the evidence from the existing literature on prices, markups, and pass-through.26
Lastly we note that conditions (B1) and (B1’) exclude the C.E.S. case, where the derivative of
the elasticities ε′p(qi) and ε′p(qi) are zero. In this limiting case, the inverse demand and marginal
revenue in Figure 1 are linear. Nevertheless, (B1) and (B1’) are consistent with most of the
functional forms that have been used to explore endogenous markups in the theoretical trade
literature.27
Demand Shocks and Product Reallocations
We have already described how an increase in demand Lc induces an increase in the toughness of
competition λ in both the long-run (GE and PE) and the short-run. We now highlight how the
demand conditions (B1) and (B1’) generate a link between increases in the toughness of competition
and product reallocations towards better performing products.
First, we note that the increase in competition λ induces a downward shift in output sales
q(v, λ) per-consumer (though not necessarily overall as the number of consumers is increasing).
This decrease in output sales q(v, λ) in turn generates changes in the price and marginal revenue
elasticities εp and εφ, which depend on conditions (B1) and (B1’). Changes in those two elasticities
then determine the changes in the elasticities of output, sales, and profit with respect to marginal
cost v (see 8-10), which govern the reallocation of output, sales, and profit across firms with different
costs v. We can now determine exactly how conditions (B1) and (B1’) affect these reallocations:
Proposition 1 (B1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for a positive demand shock to reallo-
cate operating profits to better performing products: pi(v1, λ)/pi(v2, λ) increases whenever v1 < v2.
Proof. |εpi,v| increases for all products v whenever λ increases if and only if εp(qi) is increasing
(see 10)
Proposition 2 (B1’) is a necessary and sufficient condition for a positive demand shock to real-
locate output to better performing products: q(v1, λ)/q(v2, λ) increases whenever v1 < v2.
26We will also show how the necessary condition for the French exporters evidence on product reallocations is
slightly less restrictive than (B1’).
27Those functional forms include quadratic (linear demand), Bulow-Pfleiderer, CARA, and bipower preferences.
In a separate Appendix, we review those functional forms and describe the parameter restrictions associated with
conditions (B1) and (B1’).
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Proof. |εq,v| increases for all products v whenever λ increases if and only if εφ(qi) is increasing
(see 8)
Proposition 3 (B1’) is a sufficient condition for a positive demand shock to reallocate revenue to
better performing products: r(v1, λ)/r(v2, λ) increases whenever v1 < v2. The necessary condition
is that [1− εp(qi)] /εφ(qi) is decreasing.
Proof. |εr,v| increases for all products v whenever λ increases if and only if [1− εp(qi)] /εφ(qi)
is decreasing (see 10). (B1’) implies that [1− εp(qi)] /εφ(qi) is decreasing.28
We have derived these reallocations using the per-consumer measures of performance, but since
they are all evaluated as ratios, multiplying those by the number of consumers Lc would lead to
identical outcomes (even though Lc is changing). Thus, we see that (B1’) is a sufficient condition
for all performance measures (profit, output, revenue) to be reallocated toward better performing
products. In this case, an increase in competition (higher λ) induces a steeper relationship between
a product’s cost v and its profit, output, and revenue outcome (higher elasticities |εpi,v|,|εq,v|,|εr,v|).
A given percentage reduction in cost v then translates into a higher percentage increase in those
performance outcomes. In the case of C.E.S. preferences, all those performance elasticities would
be constant, and hence changes in demand (and corresponding changes in competition λ) would
have no effect on the relative performance of products (conditional on selection into production).
The reallocation of output towards better performing products has a direct consequence for firm
productivity: the allocation of firm employment to products must respond proportionately to the
product-level output changes. Thus, for a given set of products, average productivity (an employ-
ment weighted average of product productivity 1/v) must increase whenever output is reallocated
towards better performing products.
Selection
In the short-run, we have already discussed how an increase in demand Lc and the corresponding
increase in competition λ induces an increase in the cutoffs cˆ = vˆ. In this scenario, net profit
per-product Lcpi(v, λ) − f is increasing for the high cost products with cost v close to the cutoff,
even though the operating profit per-consumer pi(v, λ) is decreasing for all products (the increase
in demand Lc dominates the negative impact of the increase in competition λ). Condition (B1)
28Bertoletti and Epifani (2014) derive a similar expression for the reallocation of revenue. However, they do not
show how that condition is implied by assumption (B1’) and requires (B1) to hold.
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then implies that the profits for the better performing products (with lower cost v) increase dispro-
portionately relative to the high cost products. Thus, net operating profit per-product increases
for all products.
In the long-run, we mentioned that the change in the cutoffs in response to an increase in demand
could not be determined without making additional assumptions on demand. Under (B1), such a
demand increase induces a disproportionate increase in operating profits for the best performing
products; thus, total firm profit Π(c, λ) becomes steeper (as a function of firm competency c).
The free entry condition (12) then requires a single crossing of the new steeper total firm profit
Π(c, λ) curve with the old flatter one (ensuring that average profit in both cases is still equal to the
constant entry cost fe). This crossing defines a new profitability cutoff c˜ whereby better performing
firms with c < c˜ enjoy a profit increase whereas worse performing firms with c > c˜ suffer a profit
loss. Hence, the zero profit cutoff cˆ (and the associated product-level cutoff vˆ) decreases, leading
to the exit of the worse performing firms (and the worse performing products for all firms). The
product-level net-profit curve Lcpi(v, λ) − f (as a function of product cost v) rotates in a similar
fashion to the firm-level profit curve: profits for the best performing products increase while they
decrease for the worse performing products. For those high performing products with low cost v,
the increase in demand Lc dominates the effect of tougher competition (higher λ) on per-consumer
profits pi(v, λ); whereas the opposite holds for the low performing products.
We further note that (B1) is also a necessary condition for this selection effect in the long
run: If (B1) were violated then the profit curves would rotate in the opposite direction, reducing
(increasing) profits for the best (worst) performing firms and products. This would result in an
increase in the cutoffs cˆ = vˆ. In the limiting C.E.S. case, the cutoffs would be unaffected by
changes in demands: the increase in demand Lc is exactly offset by the increase in competition
leaving net-profits Lcpi(v, λ)− f unchanged for all products.
4.2 Open Economy
With our empirical findings in mind, we consider a simplified three-country economy consisting
of a Home country (H: France) and a Foreign country (F : Rest of World) both exporting to a
Destination country (D). We focus on the equilibrium in this destination D, characterized by a
demand level LcD. For simplicity, we assume that this destination market is ‘small’ with respect to
economy-wide outcomes in H and F , in the sense that changes in destination D-specific variables do
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not affect those equilibrium outcomes (apart from those related to exports to D).29 In particular,
this entails that the number of entering firms in H and F , N eH and N
e
F , do not respond to changes in
demand LcD in D. (Naturally, the number of entrants N
e
D into D will respond to demand conditions
LcD in the long-run.)
Since we are interested in highlighting the impact of demand changes in destination D for
competition there, we make one further simplification: We assume that firms in D do not export
to either H or F . In this case, trade is necessarily unbalanced so we restrict our analysis to the
PE case and assume an exogenous unitary wage. In the appendix, we show how to extend the
equilibrium conditions to the GE and PE cases where firms in D export; and highlight how this
would not change any of the qualitative results regarding the impact of demand shocks in D.
Exports from l ∈ {H,F} into D incur both a per-unit iceberg cost τlD > 1 as well as a
fixed export cost flD. In order to streamline the analysis of the production decisions for domestic
producers selling in D along with exporters into D, we use the notation fDD < flD to denote the
smaller fixed cost faced by domestic producers and introduce τDD ≡ 1. Lastly, we can allow for
arbitrary technology differences across countries l ∈ {H,F,D} in terms of the product ladder cost
zl(m), the entry cost f
e
l , and the firm distribution of core competencies Γl(c).
Product-Level Performance and Selection
We now consider the production decisions for sales into D. Since the marginal cost of production is
constant and there are no cross-market or cross-product cost synergies, firms will make independent
market-level decisions per-product. Any product i sold in D will face the residual inverse demand
(4) with a unique endogenous competition level λD for that market. Any firm from l ∈ {H,F,D}
owning the blueprint for product i with marginal cost v faces a constant delivered marginal cost
τlDv for market D. All these firms therefore solve the same profit maximization problem with
respect to this delivered cost, associated with the same first order condition (6) as in the closed
economy. Thus, we can use the same optimal output, operating profit, and revenue functions as
in the closed economy to evaluate the performance of a product in destination D: q(τlDv, λD),
pi(τlDv, λD), r(τlDv, λD) capture those performance metrics (per-consumer in D) for a product
with delivered cost τlDv. Producers from l ∈ {H,F,D} will sell a product with cost v in D so
long as the associated profits are non-negative. This leads to three (for each origin) new zero-profit
29This small open economy setup with monopolistic competition follows closely the development in Demidova and
Rodrigues-Clare (2013) for the case of C.E.S. preferences.
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cutoff conditions:
pi(τlDvˆlD, λD) = flD, l ∈ {H,F,D} . (14)
All products from l with cost v ≤ vˆlD will be sold in D. Since we have assumed that the fixed
export cost is higher than the domestic market fixed cost (flD > fDD for l ∈ {H,F}), the marginal
exported product will have a lower delivered cost than the marginal domestically produced product:
τlDvˆlD < vˆDD; and it will therefore feature strictly higher performance measures (in terms of
operating profit, output, and revenues).
These product-level cutoffs will also be equal to the firm-level cutoffs for the sale of any product
in D: Only firms with core competency c ≤ cˆlD = vˆlD will operate (sell) in market D. When
l ∈ {H,F}, those cutoffs represent the firm-level export cutoff into D. When l = D, the cutoff
represents the production (survival) cutoff for domestic firms in D.
Free Entry in the Long Run
The free entry conditions for markets H and F are irrelevant for destination D, due to our as-
sumption of the former being ‘small’ relative to the latter two. In the long run, free entry into D
equalizes the expected profits for prospective entrants with the sunk entry cost. Thus, this new free
entry condition is identical to the one for the closed economy; except for the labeling of country-D
specific variables:
∞∑
m=0
[∫ ĉDD/zD(m)
0
[pi (czD(m), λD)L
c
D − fDD] dΓD(c)
]
= feD. (15)
As in the closed economy case, this free entry condition, along with the zero cutoff profit condition
(14, for l = D) jointly determine the equilibrium cutoffs vˆDD = cˆDD along with the level of
competition λD. The export cutoffs vˆlD for l ∈ {H,F} are then determined by their matching zero
cutoff profit condition in (14) given the competition level λD.
In the open economy, consumers in D spread their income over all the domestically produced
and imported products. Since the number of entrants into H and F are exogenous with respect to
country D, the budget constraint for consumers in D can still be used to directly determine the
endogenous number of entrants into D (as was the case for the closed economy):
∑
l=H,F,D
(
N el
{ ∞∑
m=0
[∫ ĉlD/zl(m)
0
r(τlDczl(m), λD)dΓl(c)
]})
= 1. (16)
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Short-Run Equilibrium
In the short-run, the number of incumbents in D is fixed at N¯D (with the same exogenous distri-
bution of core competencies ΓD(c)); and the free entry condition for firms in D no longer holds.
The budget constraint (16) still holds with the exogenous number of incumbents N¯D replacing the
endogenous number of entrants N eD. Together with the three cutoff-profit conditions (14), these
four equilibrium conditions determine the competition level λD along with the three cutoffs for
l ∈ {H,F,D}.
Demand Shocks and Product Reallocations
Using the same reasoning as previously developed for the closed economy case, we can show that
an increase in demand LcD will result in an increase in competition λD in D for both the long-run
and short-run.30 Thus, all of our previous results regarding the impact of such a demand shock
on the reallocation of profits, output, and revenue towards better performing products still hold
(Propositions 1-3). Thus, for exporters to D, we can connect demand conditions (B1) and (B1’) to
the reallocation of export sales and profits (in market D) towards better performing products.
Selection
Again using a similar reasoning to our analysis of the closed economy case, demand condition (B1)
is sufficient for the demand shock to increase the net profit for the sales of the best performing
products in D (the profits generated by sales in D) in both the long-run and short-run. Thus, so
long as the fixed export cost fHD is high enough, all exported products from H will fall into this
category and experience a profit increase following the increase in demand. This, in turn, implies
that an increase in demand leads to a fall in the export cutoffs vˆHD: Existing exporters from H
increase their range of exported products to D, and some firms from H start exporting to D.
In the long-run, condition (B1) is also necessary for the demand shock to induce the selection
of newly exported products from H to D (so long as the fixed export cost fHD is high enough).
Similar to the closed economy case, a violation of condition (B1) would imply a reduction in the
profits of the best performing products to D, thus reversing the predicted consequences for export
market selection.
30Once again, a (weak) decrease in competition λD would necessarily lead to a violation of the free entry condition
in the long-run, or the budget constraint in the short-run.
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4.3 Connecting Back to Empirical Measures of Product Reallocations in Export
Markets
We have just shown how our open economy model with demand condition (B1’) can explain all
of the evidence on the response of French exporters to demand shocks that we documented in
Section 3. It explains how positive demand shocks induce the entry of new exported products and
the reallocation of output and revenues towards the best performing products. The reallocation
of output contributes positively to a firm’s productivity (by shifting employment shares towards
products with higher marginal products).31 And the reallocation of revenues generates an increase
in the skewness of a firm’s export sales to that destination.32 Demand condition (B1’) and the
weaker version (B1) are also directly connected to the empirical evidence on firm/product markups
and pass-through. In the limiting case of C.E.S. preferences, demand shocks in export market
would have no impact on the skewness of export sales; markups are constant across products; and
pass-through is complete (equal to 1) for all products.
On its own, the evidence on the positive relationship between demand shocks and export skew-
ness requires that [1− εp(qi)] /εφ(qi) is decreasing over the range of exported output qi that we
observe. We have pointed out that condition (B1’) (εφ(qi) increasing) is sufficient for this outcome.
However, since it is not a necessary condition, our evidence for the skewness of exports does not
imply that (B1’) must hold. On the other hand, we show in the appendix that the weaker condition
(B1) (Marshall’s Second Law of Demand, εφ(qi) increasing) must nevertheless hold. In particular,
we show that even if (B1) were violated over a portion of the relevant demand curve (εp(qi) de-
creasing over some range), then this would result in a reverse prediction for export skewness over
this portion of the demand curve. This result also fits with what we know about the limiting case
of C.E.S. preferences, where demand shocks have no impact on the skewness of export sales.
Thus, our empirical evidence on the impact of demand shocks for export skewness provides an
independent confirmation for the empirical relevance of this critical property of demand – without
relying on the measurement of prices and markups.
31We document the strong empirical connection between demand shocks and firm productivity in Section 6.
32We showed how the ratio of export sales for any two products (with the better performing product in the
numerator) increases in response to a demand shock. This clearly increases the skewness of export sales. In a
separate appendix, we confirm that such an increase in skewness is reflected in the Theil and Atkinson indices that
we use in our empirical work.
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5 Trade Competition and Product Reallocations at the Firm-Level
Our theoretical model highlights how our measured demand shocks induce increases in competi-
tion for exporters to those destinations; and how the increased competition generates increases
in productivity by shifting market shares and employment towards better performing products.
We seek to directly measure this connection between demand shocks and productivity. Since we
cannot measure the productivity associated with products sold to a particular destination, we need
to show that the connection between demand shocks and product reallocations aggregates to the
firm-level – before examining the link with firm-level productivity changes (which we can directly
measure). Our results in section 3 highlighted how demand shocks lead to reallocations towards
better performing products at the destination-industry level. In this section, we show how the
destination-industry demand shocks can be aggregated to the firm-level – and this firm-level de-
mand shock strongly predicts product reallocations towards better performing products (higher
market shares) at the firm-level ; that is, changes in skewness to the firm’s global product mix (the
distribution of product sales across all destinations).
Intuitively, since there is a stable ranking of products at the firm level (better performing
products in one market are most likely to be the better performing products in other markets – as
we previously discussed), then reallocations towards better performing products within destinations
should also be reflected in the reallocations of global sales/production towards better performing
products; and the strength of this link between the skewness of sales at the destination and global
levels should depend on the importance of the destination in the firm’s global sales. Our chosen
measure of skewness, the Theil index, makes this intuition precise. It is the only measure of
skewness that exhibits a stable decomposition from the skewness of global sales into the skewness
of destination-level sales (see Jost 2007).33 Specifically, let Ti,t be firm i’s Theil index for the
skewness of its global exports by product xsi,t ≡
∑
d x
s
i,d,t (the sum of exports for that product
across all destinations).34 Then this global Theil can be decomposed into a market-share weighted
average of the within-destination Theils Ti,d,t and a “between-destination” Theil index T
B
i,d,t that
33This decomposition property is similar – but not identical – to the within/between decomposition of Theil indices
across populations. In the latter, the sample is split into subsamples. In our case, the same observation (in this case,
product sales) is split into “destinations” and the global measure reflects the sum across “destinations”.
34The Theil index is defined in the same way as the destination level Theil in (2). We return to our notation xsi,d,t
to denote firm i’s exports of product s to destination d in year t, which we use throughout our empirical analysis.
In terms of our theoretical model, this corresponds to the export revenues generated for a product m by a firm with
core competency c to destination D.
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measures differences in the distribution of product-level market shares across destinations:35
Ti,t =
∑
d
xi,d,t
xi,t
Ti,d,t −
∑
d
xi,d,t
xi,t
TBi,d,t, (17)
where xi,d,t ≡
∑
s x
s
i,d,t and xi,t ≡
∑
d xi,d,t represent firm i’s total exports to d, and across desti-
nations to the world (global exports). The between-destination Theil TBi,d,t is defined as
TBi,d,t =
∑
s
xsi,d,t
xi,d,t
log
(
xsi,d,t/xi,d,t
xsi,t/xi,t
)
.
Note that the weights used in this decomposition for both the within- and between-destination
Theils are the firm’s export shares xi,d,t/xi,t across destinations d. The between-destination Theil
TBi,d,t measures the deviation in a product’s market share in a destination d, x
s
i,d,t/xi,d,t, from that
product’s global market share xsi,t/xi,t and then averages these deviations across destinations. It is
positive and converges to zero as the distributions of product market shares in different destination
become increasingly similar.
To better understand the logic behind (17), note that it implies that the average of the within-
destination Theil indices can be decomposed into the sum of two positive elements: the global
Theil index, and the between-destination Theil index. This decomposition can be interpreted as
a decomposition of variance/dispersion. The dispersion observed in the destination level product
exports must be explained either by dispersion in global product exports (global Theil index), or
by the fact that the distribution of product sales varies across destinations (between-destination
Theil index).
A simple example helps to clarify this point. Take a firm with 2 products and 2 destinations.
In each destination, exports of one product are x, and exports of the other product are 2x. This
leads to the same value for the within-destination Theil indices of (1/3) ln (1/3) + (2/3) ln(2/3),
and hence the same value for the average within-destination Theil index. Hence, if the same
product is the better performing product in each market (with 2x exports), then the distributions
will be synchronized across destinations and the between-destination Theil will be zero: all of the
dispersion is explained by the global Theil index, whose value is equal to the common value of the
two within-destination Theil indices. On the other hand, if the opposite products perform better
in each market, global sales are 3x for each product. There is thus no variation in global product
35For simplicity, we omit the industry referencing I for the destination Theils. The decomposition across industries
follows a similar pattern.
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sales, and the global Theil index is zero. Accordingly, all of the variation in the within-destination
Theil indices is explained by the between-destination Theil.
The theoretical model of Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) with CES demand predicts that
the between-destination Theil index would be exactly zero when measured on a common set of
exported products across destinations. With linear demand, Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014)
show (theoretically and empirically) that this between-destination index would deviate from zero
because skewness varies across destinations. We have shown earlier that this result holds for
a larger class of demand systems such that the elasticity and the convexity of inverse demand
increase with consumption. Yet, even in these cases, the between-destination Theil is predicted to
be small because the ranking of the product sales is very stable across destinations. This leads to
a prediction that the market-share weighted average of the destination Theils should be strongly
correlated with the firm’s global Theil. Empirically, this prediction is strongly confirmed as shown
in the firm-level scatter plot (across all years) in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Correlation Between Global Skewness and Average Local Skewness
This high correlation between destination and global skewness of product sales enables us
to move from our previous predictions for the effects of the demand shocks on skewness at the
destination-level to a new prediction at the firm-level. To do this, we aggregate our destination-
industry measures of demand shocks to the firm-level using the same weighing scheme by the firms’
export shares across destinations. We thus obtain our firm-level demand shock in (log) levels and
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first difference:
shocki,t ≡
∑
d,I
xIi,d,t0
xi,t0
× shockIi,d,t, ∆˜shocki,t =
∑
d,I
xIi,d,t−1
xi,t−1
× ∆˜shockIi,d,t,
where xi,t ≡
∑
d,I x
I
i,d,t represents firm i’s total exports in year t. As was the case for the construc-
tion of our firm-level destination shock (see equation 1), we only use the firm-level information on
exported products and market shares in prior years (the year of first export sales t0 for the demand
shock in levels and lagged year t − 1 for the first difference between t and t − 1). This ensures
the exogeneity of our constructed firm-level demand shocks (exogenous to firm-level actions in year
t > t0 for levels, and exogenous to firm-level changes ∆t for first differences). In particular, changes
in the set of exported products or exported market shares are not reflected in the demand shock.36
By construction, our firm-level demand shocks will predict changes in the weighted average of
destination skewness Ti,d,t – and hence will predict changes in the firm’s global skewness Ti,t (given
the high correlation between the two indices). This result is confirmed by our regression of the
firms’ global Theil on our trade shock measures, reported in the first three columns of Table 6. Our
firm-level trade shock has a strong and highly significant (again, well beyond the 1% significance
level) impact on the skewness of global exports. The industry level trade shock – which was already
substantially weaker than the firm-level trade shock in the destination-level regressions – is no longer
significant at the firm level. The GDP shock is not significant in the (log) levels regressions, but is
very strong and significant in the two first-difference specifications.
Our global Theil measure Ti,t measures the skewness of export sales across all destinations,
but it does not entirely reflect the skewness of production levels across the firm’s product range.
That is because we cannot measure the breakdown of product-level sales on the French domestic
market. Ultimately, it is the distribution of labor allocation across products (and the induced
distribution of production levels) that determines a firm’s labor productivity – conditional on its
technology (the production functions for each individual product). As highlighted by our theoretical
model, the export market demand shocks generate two different types of reallocations that both
contribute to an increased skewness of production levels for the firm: reallocations within the set of
exported products, which generate the increased skewness of global exports that we just discussed;
but also reallocations from non-exported products towards the better performing exported products
36Lileeva and Trefler (2010), Hummels et al (2014), and Bernard et al (2014) use a similar strategy to construct
firm-level trade-related trade shocks.
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Table 6: The Impact of Demand Shocks on the Global Product Mix (Firm Level)
Dependent Variable Ti,t ∆Ti,t Exp. Intensi,t ∆ Exp. Intensi,t
Specification FE FD FD-FE FE FD FD-FE
log GDP Shock -0.001 0.003a
(0.004) (0.001)
log trade shock 0.045a 0.010a
(0.009) (0.003)
log trade shock - ISIC -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
∆˜ GDP Shock 0.117a 0.106a 0.041a 0.038a
(0.031) (0.038) (0.010) (0.013)
∆˜ trade shock 0.057a 0.050a 0.016a 0.014a
(0.011) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004)
∆˜ trade shock - ISIC -0.003 -0.009 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 117981 117981 117981 111860 109049 109049
FE refers to firm-level fixed effects. Standard errors (clustered at the firm level) in parentheses: c < 0.1, b <
0.05, a < 0.01.
(including the extensive margin of newly exported products that we documented at the destination-
level). Although we cannot measure the domestic product-level sales, we can measure a single
statistic that reflects this reallocation from non-exported to exported goods: the firm’s export
intensity. We can thus test whether the demand shocks also induce an increase in the firm’s export
intensity. Those regressions are reported in the last three columns of Table 6, and confirm that
our firm-level trade shock has a very strong and highly significant positive impact on a firm’s
export intensity.37 The impact of the GDP coefficient is also strong and significant, whereas the
industry-level trade shock remains insignificant. Thus, our firm-level trade shock and GDP shock
both predict the two types of reallocations towards better performing products that we highlighted
in our theoretical model (as a response to increased competition in export markets).
37Since the export intensity is a ratio, we do not apply a log-transformation to that variable. However, specifications
using the log of export intensity yield very similar results.
32
6 Trade Competition and Productivity
We just showed that our firm-level measure of demand shocks (aggregated across destinations)
predicts increases in the skewness of global exports, and increases in export intensity. Holding
firm technology fixed (the productivity of each individual product), this increase in the skewness
of global production will generate productivity increases for the firm. We now directly test for this
connection from the demand shocks to firm productivity.
We obtain our measure of firm productivity by merging our firm-level trade data with firm-level
production data. This latter dataset contains various measures of firm outputs and inputs. As
we are interested in picking up productivity fluctuations at a yearly frequency, we focus on labor
productivity. We then separately control for the impact of changes in factor intensities and returns
to scale (or variable utilization of labor) on labor productivity.
We compute labor productivity at the firm-level as deflated value added per worker assuming
a sector-specific price deflator P I . Note that this measure aggregates to the overall deflated value-
added per worker for manufacturing. This aggregate productivity measure accurately tracks a
welfare-relevant quantity index – even though we do not have access to firm-level prices: The effect
of pure markup changes at the industry level are netted-out of our productivity measure.38
More formally, we can write the welfare-relevant aggregate industry labor productivity – the
ratio of industry deflated value-added (VAI/P I) over industry employment LI – as the labor share
weighted average of firm productivity using that same industry price deflator P I for firm revenue:
ΦI ≡ VA
I/P I
LI
=
∑
i∈I
Li
LI
VAi/P
I
Li
(18)
In other words, the revenue-based firm productivity measure
(
VAi/P
I
)
/Li aggregates up to a
quantity-based industry measure, using the empirically observed firm labor shares Li/L
I and with-
out any need for a quantity based output or productivity measure at the level of the firm (which
would require measures of firm-product-level prices and qualities). This implicitly assumes the exis-
tence of an industry price aggregator P I , though its functional form is left completely unrestricted.
Consequently, we run all of our specifications with sector-time (2 digit NACE) fixed effects, thus
eliminating the need for any direct measures of those sector-level deflators.39 Our productivity
38At the firm-level, an increase in markups across all products will be picked-up in our firm productivity measure
– even though this does not reflect a welfare-relevant increase in output. But if this is the case, then this firm’s labor
share will decrease, and its productivity will carry a smaller weight in the aggregate index.
39We have also experimented with an alternative procedure using deflated value-added per worker (the value added
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results therefore capture within-sector effects of the demand shocks, over-and-above any contribu-
tion of the sector deflator to a common productivity change across firms. We will thus report a
welfare-relevant aggregate productivity change by aggregating our firm-level productivity changes
using the observed changes in labor shares.
Our firm-level demand shocks only aggregate across export destinations. They therefore do
not incorporate a firm’s exposure to demand shocks in its domestic (French) market. This is not
possible for two reasons: most importantly, we do not observe the product-level breakdown of
the firms’ sales in the French market (we only observe total domestic sales across products); in
addition, world exports into France would not be exogenous to firm-level technology changes in
France. Therefore, we need to adjust our export-specific demand shock using the firm’s export
intensity to obtain an overall firm-level demand shock relevant for overall production and hence
productivity:
shock intensi,t =
xi,t0
xi,t0 + xi,F,t0
shocki,t, ∆˜shock intensi,t =
xi,t−1
xi,t−1 + xi,F,t−1
∆˜shocki,t,
where xi,F,t denotes firm i’s total (across products) sales to the French domestic market in year
t (and the ratio thus measures firm i’s export intensity).40 Once again, we only use prior year’s
information on firm-level sales to construct this overall demand shock. Note that this adjustment
using export intensity is equivalent to assuming a demand shock of zero in the French market and
including that market in our aggregation by market share relative to total firm sales xi,t + xi,F,t.
6.1 Impact of the Trade Shock on Firm Productivity
In this section, we investigate the direct link between this firm-level demand shock and firm produc-
tivity. Here, we focus exclusively on our firm-specific demand shock from (1). Most importantly,
this is our only demand shock that exhibits variation across firms within destinations.41 In addition,
this is the demand shock that induced the strongest and most robust response in the skewness of
the intensive margin of product exports. Our measure of productivity is the log of value-added per
deflator coming from EUKLEMS dataset for France) and year fixed-effects (dropping the industry-year combined
fixed effects). The differences in the results are negligible.
40Since xi,F,t is only available in the firm balance sheet data (and not in the customs data), we use the reported firm
total export figure xi,t from the same balance sheet data to compute this ratio. This ensures a consistent measurement
for the firm’s export intensity. The correlation between this firm total export figure and the one reported by customs
is .95 (very high, though exhibiting some differences between the two data sources).
41As a robustness check reported in appendix C, we purge the trade shock of any industry-destination-year effect
in order to eliminate any correlation between destination characteristics and unobserved firm attributes associated
with higher productivity growth. This approach precludes using the GDP and ISIC level trade shocks.
34
worker. All regressions include industry-year fixed effects, that will capture in particular different
evolutions of price indexes across industries. In order to control for changes in capital intensity,
we use the log of capital per worker. We also control for unobserved changes in labor utilization
and returns to scale by using the log of raw materials (including energy use). Then, increases in
worker effort or higher returns to scale will be reflected in the impact of raw materials use on labor
productivity. As there is no issue with zeros for all these firm-level variables, we directly measure
the growth rate of those variable using simple first differences of the log levels.
We begin with a graphical representation of the strong positive relationship between firm-
level productivity and our constructed demand shock. Figure 3 illustrates the correlation between
those variables in first differences for the largest French exporters (representing 50% of French
exports in 1996). Panel (a) is the unconditional scatter plot for those variables, while panel (b)
shows the added-variable plot for the first-difference regression of productivity on the trade shock,
with additional controls for capital intensity, raw materials (both in log first-differences) and time
dummies. Those figures clearly highlight the very strong positive response of the large exporters’
productivity to changes in trade competition in export markets (captured by the demand shock).
Figure 3: Exporters Representing 50% of French Trade in 1996: First Differences 1996-2005
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Table 7 shows how this result generalizes to our full sample of firms and our three different
specifications (FE, FD, FD-FE). Our theoretical model emphasizes how a multi-product firm’s
productivity responds to the demand shock via its effect on competition and product reallocations
35
in the firm’s export markets. Thus, we assumed that the firm’s technology at the product level (the
marginal cost v(m, c) for each product m) was exogenous (in particular, with respect to demand
fluctuations in export markets). However, there is a substantial literature examining how this
technology responds to export market conditions via various forms of innovation or investment
choices made by the firm. We feel that the timing dimension of our first difference specifications –
especially our FD-FE specifications which nets out any firm-level growth trends – eliminates this
technology response channel: It is highly unlikely that a firm’s innovation or investment response
to the trade shock in a given year (especially with respect to the trade shock’s deviation from trend
growth in the FD-FE specification) would be reflected contemporaneously in the firm’s productivity.
However, we will also show some additional robustness checks that address this potential technology
response.
The first three columns of Table 7 show that, across our three timing specifications, there is
a stable and very strong response of firm productivity to the trade shock. Since our measure
of productivity as value added per worker incorporates neither the impact of changes in input
intensities nor the effects of non-constant returns to scale, we directly control for these effects
in the next set of regressions. In the last 3 columns of Table 7, we add controls for capital per
worker and raw material use (including energy). Both of these controls are highly significant: not
surprisingly, increases in capital intensity are reflected in labor productivity; and we find that
increases in raw materials use are also associated with higher labor productivity. This would be
the case if there are increasing returns to scale in the value-added production function, or if labor
utilization/effort increases with scale (in the short-run). However, even when these controls are
added, the very strong effect of the trade shock on firm productivity remains highly significant
well beyond the 1% significance level (from here on out, we will keep those controls in all of our
firm-level productivity regressions).
Although our trade shock variable exhibits variation within destinations it nevertheless also
reflects the impact of aggregate destination shocks. This could potentially generate a selection
bias if firms with unobserved characteristics leading to higher productivity growth self-select into
destinations with positive aggregate destination shocks (or vice-versa). In order to eliminate this
possibility, we generate a version of our trade shock that is purged (demeaned) of any industry-
destination-year effects (trends for the FD-FE specification). Using this purged measure instead of
our original one strengthen the impact of the trade shock on firm productivity (but leaves the impact
of the other controls virtually un-changed). This robustness check is reported in the appendix.
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Table 7: Baseline Results: Impact of Trade Shock on Firm Productivity
Dependent Variable log prod. ∆ log prod. log prod. ∆ log prod.
Specification FE FD FD-FE FE FD FD-FE
log (trade shock × export intens.) 0.061a 0.051a
(0.016) (0.016)
∆˜ (trade shock × export intens.) 0.106a 0.106a 0.112a 0.113a
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024)
log capital stock per worker 0.117a
(0.004)
log raw materials 0.086a
(0.003)
∆ log capital stock per worker 0.125a 0.133a
(0.005) (0.006)
∆ log raw materials 0.092a 0.090a
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 213001 185688 185688 203977 175619 175619
FE refers to firm-level fixed effects. All regressions also include industry-year dummies. Standard errors
(clustered at the firm level) in parentheses: c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a < 0.01.
We now describe several robustness checks that further single-out our theoretical mechanism
operating through the demand-side product reallocations for multi-product firms. In the next table
we regress our capital intensity measure on our trade shock; the results in Table 8 show that there
is no response of investment to the trade shock. This represents another way to show that the
short-run timing for the demand shocks precludes a contemporaneous technology response: if this
were the case, we would expect to see some of this response reflected in higher investment (along
with other responses along the technology dimension).
Next we use a different strategy to control for the effects of non-constant returns to scale
or variable labor utilization: in Table 9, we split our sample between year intervals where firms
increase/decrease employment. If the effects of the trade shock on productivity were driven by scale
effects or higher labor utilization/effort, then we would expect to see the productivity responses
concentrated in the split of the sample where firms are expanding employment (and also expanding
more generally). Yet, Table 9 shows that this is not the case: the effect of the trade shock on
productivity is just as strong (even a bit stronger) in the sub-sample of years where firms are
decreasing employment; and in both cases, the coefficients have a similar magnitude to our baseline
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Table 8: Capital Intensity Does Not Respond to Trade Shocks
Dependent Variable ln K/L ∆ ln K/L ∆ ln K/L
Specification FE FD FD-FE
log (trade shock × export intens.) 0.029
(0.021)
∆˜ (trade shock × export intens.) 0.015 0.002
(0.022) (0.027)
Observations 218073 190512 190512
FE refers to firm fixed effects. All regressions also include industry-year dummies.
Standard errors (clustered at the firm level) in parentheses:c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a <
0.01.
results in Table 7.42
Table 9: Robustness to Scale Effects
Sample Employment Increase Employment Decrease
Dependent Variable ∆ log productivity ∆ log productivity
Specification FD FD
∆˜ (trade shock × export intens.) 0.128a 0.170a
(0.034) (0.033)
∆ log capital stock per worker 0.108a 0.104a
(0.006) (0.006)
∆ log raw materials 0.100a 0.096a
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 69881 65739
All regressions include industry-year dummies. Standard errors (clustered at the firm
level) in parentheses: c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a < 0.01.
A potential concern with our trade shock variable weighting demand shocks in the destination
country by export shares is that it would be correlated with import shocks, i.e. with supply shocks
originating from the same foreign countries and affecting directly production costs of French firms
through imported intermediate goods. We therefore construct a symmetric set of variables that
weight changes in exports (to the world except France) from a given product/country by the firm-
level import shares from that product/country. Table 10 introduces those new variables into the
baseline specification. Although import shocks have a separate large and very significant effect, it
42Since we are splitting our sample across firms, we no longer rely on the two specifications with firm fixed-effects
and only show results for the FD specification.
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does not affect our main effect of interest in any major way.
Table 10: Robustness to Import Shocks
Dependent Variable log prod. ∆ log prod. log prod. ∆ log prod.
Specification FE FD FD-FE FE FD FD-FE
log (trade shock × export intens.) 0.068a 0.056a
(0.020) (0.019)
log (trade shock × import intens.) 0.078a 0.065b
(0.029) (0.028)
∆˜ (trade shock × export intens.) 0.110a 0.111a 0.129a 0.133a
(0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027)
∆˜ (trade shock × import intens.) 0.225a 0.245a 0.197a 0.218a
(0.034) (0.041) (0.033) (0.041)
log capital stock per worker 0.095a
(0.004)
log raw materials 0.090a
(0.004)
∆ log capital stock per worker 0.107a 0.115a
(0.005) (0.006)
∆ log raw materials 0.091a 0.090a
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 133382 152171 152171 129517 144938 144938
FE refers to firm-level fixed effects. All regressions also include industry-year dummies. Standard errors
(clustered at the firm level) in parentheses: c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a < 0.01.
In order to further single-out our theoretical mechanism operating through the demand-side
product reallocations for multi-product firms, we now report two different types of falsification
tests. Our first test highlights that the link between productivity and the trade shocks is only
operative for multi-product firms. Table 11 reports the same regression (with controls) as our
baseline results from Table 7, but only for single-product exporters. This new table clearly shows
that this there is no evidence of this link among this subset of firms. Next, we show that this
productivity-trade link is only operative for firms with a substantial exposure to export markets
(measured by export intensity). Similarly to single-product firms, we would not expect to find a
significant productivity-trade link among firms with very low export intensity. This is indeed the
case. In Table 12, we re-run our baseline specification using the trade shock before it is interacted
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with export intensity. The first three columns report the results for the quartile of firms with the
lowest export intensity, and highlight that there is no evidence of the productivity-trade link for
those firms. On the other hand, we clearly see from the last three columns that this effect is very
strong and powerful for the quartile of firms with the highest export intensity.43
When we focus on this top quartile for export intensity, we are restricting our sample to sub-
stantially larger exporters. If a French exporter is dominant in some of its export destinations, then
our exogeneity assumption for rest-of-world exports to those destinations may be violated. In this
situation where a French firm has a substantial market share for some destination-product market,
it is possible for the rest-of-the-world exports to respond to that firm’s change in productivity.
First, we note that this would likely bias our coefficient downwards, as a French firm’s productiv-
ity increase would induce other exporters to reduce their shipments in their competing markets.
We can nevertheless address this potential endogeneity directly by dropping any firm that could
hypothetically impact rest-of-world exports. We have experimented with several different market
thresholds, and have found that exclusions of those firms either leave those key coefficients on the
trade shock unaffected, or sometimes raises them.44
The firms with high export intensity therefore have a response of productivity to trade shocks
estimated around 10% (columns 5 and 6 of Table 12). How should we interpret this number in
terms of the impact of our mechanism on the productivity of the French economy as a whole? As we
previously discussed, our firm-level measure of productivity does not correspond directly to physical
productivity since we cannot adjust for changes in firm-product prices and qualities. However, as
we pointed out (see equation 18), this firm-level productivity measure can be aggregated up to a
sector level measure of physical productivity using the firms’ labor shares. Side-stepping the issues
of measurement for the sector price index P I , we can directly measure the separate contribution of
the trade shock to sectoral productivity.
We start with the coefficient on the trade shock for the high export-intensity quartile βq4 for the
specifications in first differences. This gives us the percentage productivity response to a 1% trade
shock for the firms in the fourth quartile. We assume that there is no response of productivity for the
firms in the remaining 3 quartiles. We can then use each firm’s measured trade shock to calculate an
43Since the trade shock as not been interacted with export intensity, the coefficients for this top quartile represent
significantly higher magnitudes than the average coefficients across the whole sample reported in Table 7 (since export
intensity is always below 1). This is also confirmed by a specification with the interacted trade shock restricted to
this same top quartile of firms.
44For example, one of our more aggressive thresholds was the exclusion of any firm with an average product-
destination market share (for any year) exceeding 10%. In this case, the coefficients for the trade shock corresponding
to columns 4-6 of Table 12 are (standard errors in parentheses): FE: .070 (.030); FD: .170 (.038); FD-FE: .170 (.045).
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Table 11: Robustness: Single Product Firms
Dependent Variable log prod. ∆ log prod.
Specification FE FD FD-FE
log (trade shock × export intens.) -0.050
(0.047)
log capital stock per worker 0.180a
(0.013)
log raw materials 0.085a
(0.007)
∆˜ (trade shock × export intens.) 0.038 0.012
(0.044) (0.066)
∆ log capital stock per worker 0.214a 0.260a
(0.013) (0.019)
∆ log raw materials 0.103a 0.100a
(0.007) (0.011)
Observations 33198 25519 25519
FE refers to firm fixed effects. All regressions also include industry-year dummies. Stan-
dard errors (clustered at the firm level) in parentheses: c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a < 0.01.
induced percentage productivity change for each firm in the fourth quartile. Aggregating those using
the observed changes in the firms’ labor shares yields the overall contribution to aggregate physical
productivity changes from the observed trade shocks (at the sector or total manufacturing level).
Since equation (18) aggregates productivity in levels, we calculate the counterfactual productivity
level for each firm in period t + 1 by applying this productivity change to the firm’s observed
productivity in period t. We then compute the ratios of the counterfactual aggregate productivity
level for t + 1 and the observed aggregate productivity level in period t. The percentage changes
reported in column 1 of Table 13 are the yearly averages of those ratios. This table uses the βq4 =
.092 coefficient from the FD specification (the results for βq4 = .101 for the FD-FE specification
would be roughly 10% higher). We use the same aggregation method to obtain sector and total
manufacturing level changes in the trade shock – only for the firms in the fourth quartile (the trade
shock for all remaining firms is set to 0). Those aggregate changes in the trade shock are reported in
column 2. The labor shares used to compute those aggregate changes in columns 1 and 2 are based
on total employment across all export intensity quartiles (not just as a fraction of employment in
the fourth quartile). Those reported changes are therefore diluted by the zero contributions for
all firms in the bottom three quartiles. Column 3 reports the employment share for those firms
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Table 12: Robustness: Low/High Export Intensity
Sample exp. intens. quartile # 1 exp. intens. quartile # 4
Dependent Variable log prod. ∆ log prod. log prod. ∆ log prod.
Specification FE FD FD-FE FE FD FD-FE
log trade shock 0.003 0.072a
(0.006) (0.011)
log capital stock per worker 0.117a 0.104a
(0.009) (0.007)
log raw materials 0.070a 0.111a
(0.005) (0.006)
∆˜ trade shock 0.004 0.006 0.092a 0.101a
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.016)
∆ log capital stock per worker 0.125a 0.129a 0.107a 0.114a
(0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010)
∆ log raw materials 0.084a 0.081a 0.108a 0.104a
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 38806 30909 30909 57267 48716 48716
Standard errors (clustered at the firm level) in parentheses: c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a < 0.01.
in the fourth quartile, while column 4 reports the overall employment share (all quartiles) for the
sector (as with the first two columns those numbers are yearly averages). Our results for the
productivity changes range from an average annual impact of 3.4 % for wearing apparel, to a small
negative impact for refined petroleum for instance. Overall, we find that the aggregate impact of
the trade shocks is substantial – accounting for a 1.2% average productivity growth rate for the
entire French manufacturing sector (working only through the productivity linkages for the firms
with the highest export intensities). This amounts to a 12% productivity gain over our ten year
sample period from 1995-2005. Taking the ratio of the annual 1.2% productivity gain to the 6.2%
trade shock change, we see that the .092 firm-level elasticity obtained in Table 12 is doubled to
.193 for aggregate productivity. This reflects the contribution of labor share reallocations towards
firms with relatively higher trade shocks.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses detailed firm-level data to assess the relevance and magnitude of a new channel
of gains from trade: the productivity gains associated with demand shocks in export markets (via
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Table 13: Quantification of Trade Shock Effect on Productivity
Industry prod. trade shock % high exp.intens. % mfg. emp.
Wearing apparel 3.38 5.21 27.36 2.26
Wood 3.37 6.34 20.36 1.70
Tobacco 3.22 43.60 .48 .16
Printing and publishing 2.81 8.48 5.36 3.31
Radio, television and communication 1.80 4.94 59.77 4.31
Leather and footwear 1.79 3.59 26.86 1.21
Textiles 1.69 1.99 33.04 3.29
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.62 9.80 52.39 7.82
Machinery 1.32 5.54 45.40 9.12
Manufacturing nec 1.19 5.94 22.72 3.56
Pulp and paper 1.18 3.67 30.62 2.82
Chemicals 1.15 6.58 40.55 9.63
Fabricated metal .94 7.04 17.41 8.81
Medical, precision and optical instruments .85 5.84 46.82 3.53
Rubber and plastics .80 5.75 36.97 7.18
Electrical machinery .73 5.83 53.12 5.17
Basic metals .70 6.27 58.91 4.06
Food and beverages .66 6.20 14.12 11.88
Other transport equipment .65 7.25 69.14 4.30
Office machinery .64 3.70 42.55 1.09
Other non-metallic mineral .46 3.89 35.52 3.86
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel -.18 5.12 25.54 .93
Total Manufacturing 1.17 6.20 36.66 100.00
Columns (1) and (2) provide average percentage changes over the 1996-2005 period.
the induced effect of demand on the product mix of exporters). Our theoretical model predicts
that demand shocks generate an endogenous increase in local competition that induces firms to
skew their sales towards their better performing products – generating increases in productivity.
Empirically, our data matches individual export flows by French firms to each country in the world
with balance sheet data needed to evaluate the impact of demand shocks on productivity and to
control for confounding factors. The strategy is therefore to look at product mix changes inside the
firm, rather than reallocations of market shares across firms. We can therefore control for many
alternative explanations that might be correlated with foreign demand shocks – a strategy that
would not be possible when evaluating the effects across firms.
Our baseline results shows that the elasticity of labor productivity to trade shocks is between
5 and 11 %. This order of magnitude is very robust to controls for short-run investment by the
firm, scale effects, and possibly correlated import shocks. Our measured productivity effect for
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single product firms is nil, further highlighting the importance of changes in product mix for multi-
product firms. We also show that this productivity response is concentrated within the quartile of
exporters with the highest export intensities. Taking into account the weight of those firms in the
whole economy, we calculate that the average annual increase in French manufacturing productivity
– in response to growth in world trade – over our 10 year sample (from 1995-2005) is slightly over
1 percent per year.
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Appendix
A Demand Conditions (B1) and (B1’)
The definitions of inverse demand (4) and marginal revenue (5) imply that the elasticities of these
two curves must satisfy:
ε′p(qi)qi
1− εp(qi) = εφ(qi)− εp(qi). (19)
In addition, the assumptions (A1)-(A3) required for the consumer and firm maximization problems
further imply that 0 ≤ εp(qi) < 1 and εφ(qi) > 0. Thus, we see that εp(qi) is increasing (decreasing)
if and only if εφ(qi) is above (below) εp(qi). Thus, demand condition (B1) (εp(qi) increasing) holds
if and only if the pass-though elasticity θ ≡ ∂ ln p(q(v, λ)/∂ ln v = εp/εφ is less than 1 (pass-through
is incomplete).
We now show that demand condition (B1’) implies (B1) and that [1− εp(qi)] /εφ(qi) decreasing
also implies (B1). To show this, we impose one further – but very mild – condition on the convexity
of demand at qi = 0: limqi→0 ε′p(qi)qi ≥ 0. This just rules out an extreme form of demand convexity
at zero consumption (though, implicitly, this assumption also relies on the continuity of demand for
qi ≥ 0). It can only be violated if limqi→0 ε′p(qi) = −∞ and in addition requires ε′p(qi) to decrease to
−∞ faster than −1/qi as qi → 0. So long as this condition holds, then εφ(0) ≥ εp(0) with equality
if ε′p(0) ≤ 0.
A.1 (B1’) Implies (B1)
Assume (B1’) holds: ε′φ(qi) > 0. Given (19), ε
′
p(qi) ≤ 0 implies εp(qi) ≥ εφ(qi) over that range for
qi. Given our assumption that εp(0) ≤ εφ(0), this can only happen after εp(qi) cuts εφ(qi) from
below (or at qi = 0). This in turn would imply that εp(qi) is strictly increasing at the intersection
point qi = q¯: εp(q¯) ≥ εφ(q¯) > 0. This contradicts (19) which requires ε′p(q¯) = 0. Thus, εp(qi) must
be strictly below εφ(qi) for all qi > 0. Given (19), this entails ε
′
p(qi) ≥ 0 with the inequality strict
for qi > 0. Thus, εp(qi) must be strictly increasing.
A.2 [1− εp(qi)] /εφ(qi) Decreasing Implies (B1)
If [1− εp(qi)] /εφ(qi) is decreasing, then εp(qi) and εφ(qi) cannot both be decreasing. However
ε′p(qi) < 0 would imply that εφ(qi) is also decreasing and thus represents a violation. More formally,
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the average ε′φ(qi) over any interval [0, q¯] must then be negative (given (19) and ε
′
p(qi) < 0):
ε′φ =
1
q¯
∫ q¯
0
ε′(qi)dqi = εφ(q¯)− εφ(0) ≤ εp(q¯)− εp(0) < 0.
This highlights that ε′φ(qi) ≥ 0 cannot hold over the entire interval [0, q¯]. So εφ(qi) is decreasing on
average, and must be decreasing over a subset of [0, q¯] for any q¯ > 0. This reasoning also applies to
cases where εp(qi) is initially increasing then decreasing. Say that εp(qi) is decreasing starting at
q1 > 0. Then, the average ε′φ < 0 over any interval [q1, q2]. (Since the εφ and εp curves must cross
at q1 where εp(q1) = 0.)
B Allowing for the Destination Country to Export
In the main text we simplified our analysis by assuming that firms in D do not export. In the short-
run, allowing for such exporting opportunities would have no impact on the equilibrium outcome
for D. In the long-run, the free entry condition for D would change, reflecting the average exporting
profits for a prospective entrant:
∑
l=F,H,D
( ∞∑
m=0
{∫ cˆDl/zD(m)
0
[pi (τDlcz(m), λl)L
c
l − fDl] dΓD(c)
})
= feD,
where τDl and fDl represent the export costs from D to l = H,F ; L
c
l and λl represent market
size and competition in export market l (exogenous due to the ‘small’ country assumption); and
cˆDl represent the export cutoffs. Although those cutoffs are endogenous, they only depend on the
exogenous demand conditions in l (along with the exogenous export costs). Thus, those cutoffs
do not depend on demand conditions in D (either LcD or λD). Thus, the average export profits
in the condition above can be written in terms of variables that are exogenous to those demand
conditions; moving those average profits to the right-hand side, we obtain:
∞∑
m=0
[∫ ĉDD/zD(m)
0
[pi (czD(m), λD)L
c
D − fDD] dΓD(c)
]
=
feD −
∑
l=F,H
( ∞∑
m=0
{∫ cˆDl/zD(m)
0
[pi (τDlcz(m), λl)L
c
l − fDl] dΓD(c)
})
.
The left-hand side of this free entry condition is identical to the one we derived in (15) for the case
where there are no exports from D. Since the right-hand side does not depend on market conditions
48
in D, all of our comparative statics with respect to those conditions will remain unchanged (it is
as-if we changed the level of the entry cost for D to this new right-hand side level).
C Robustness Tables
Table 14: Impact of Purged Trade Shock on Firm Productivity
Dependent Variable log prod. ∆ log prod. log prod. ∆ log prod.
Specification FE FD FD-FE FE FD FD-FE
log (trade shock × export intens.)–purged 0.118a 0.101a
(0.021) (0.021)
∆˜ (trade shock × export intens.)–purged 0.128a 0.134a 0.136a 0.141a
(0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028)
log capital stock per worker 0.117a
(0.004)
log raw materials 0.086a
(0.003)
∆ log capital stock per worker 0.125a 0.133a
(0.005) (0.006)
∆ log raw materials 0.092a 0.090a
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 213001 185688 185688 203977 175619 175619
FE refers to firm-level fixed effects. All regressions also include industry-year dummies. Standard errors
(clustered at the firm level) in parentheses: c < 0.1, b < 0.05, a < 0.01.
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